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Abstract
From the social struggles that are found all over the globe, it is important to 
try to analyze the territorial dispossession suffered by the peasant communities, 
by the transnational mining companies. For this, we rely on categories such as 
accumulation through elimination in order to know if social exclusion is an event 
in the development of capitalism or responds to an abrupt struggle between labor 
and capital. In this sense, we are interested in focusing our study on two cases that 
are found in Peru and Mexico. In such regions, social mobilization has not only 
developed as a generalized form of rejection of mining but also accounts for the 
contradictions of the mining industry.
Keywords: social exclusion, accumulation by dispossession, work, extractive 
capitalism, state
1. Introduction
Despite the capitalist world crisis that is experienced, Peru seems to be living a 
fairy tale. For the government sector, business, and several international organiza-
tions, the country is going through an economic bonanza. For the Inter-American 
Development Bank, Peru has shown robust economic growth uninterruptedly 
during the last 10 years [1]. But this growth is largely due to the investment of 
transnational capital that is developed in this country, it is mining or extractive 
companies that with the help of the state are stripping communal territories and 
thereby restructuring social relations.
Mining in Peru has become one of the largest sources of income. According to 
the Ministry of Energy and Mines estimates, the gross domestic product until the 
beginning of 2013 was 5%, and, of course, one of the sectors that contribute most 
to the said GDP is mining [2]. The IMF [1] considers Peru as the propitious place for 
private investment: according to this organization, this country “has become one 
of the most liberal and open economies not only in Latin America but, as the IMF 
maintains in a recent country study, in the world” [p. 54].
Also, ECLAC maintains that “the most industrialized countries were financially 
integrated into the world economy (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) 
with an annual growth of 4.4%, with a partial recovery of Brazil’s growth (2.7%), 
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but with higher rates in Peru (5.7%), Chile (4.9%), Colombia (4.5%) and Mexico 
(4.0%)” [3]. However, the reality of these countries is different: in Peru, the gaps at 
the local, regional, and central levels become more evident with the mobilizations 
and struggles that emerge as contradictions of mining capitalism, for example, that 
economic growth and high rates of mining (transnational) investment cannot be 
made poverty and unemployment, but quite the opposite, we refer to the precariza-
tion of the human condition and a continuous accumulation by legitimate dispos-
session by the state.
Without a doubt, one of the great problems that afflicts the mining sector is its 
relationship with the high rates of unemployment and poverty. These facts are evi-
dent in Espinar, province of the Department of Cusco. According to the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, Cusco receives from the mining canon annually $ 2364 mil-
lion soles, and its province as Espinar receives a total of $ 203 million soles [4]. Also, 
according to studies, the provinces with the highest per capita income are Espinar 
and the Convention. It is estimated that per capita income per person in Espinar 
(capital) is 556 soles, while in Condoroma (where mining is developed) amounts to 
3094 soles. In addition, in one of the districts of La Convencion, Echarate, the per 
capita income is 10,209 soles [5].
However, despite the fact that the revenues from canon and mining overhang 
are the highest, unemployment and poverty still persist. According to data from 
the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics, 51.1% of the population of the 
Department of Cusco lives in poverty, and 28% of its population lives in extreme 
poverty; in turn, in the province of Espinar, according to figures and surveys, 
64.4% of the population lives in poverty and 33.3% extreme poverty [6, 7]. The 
extractive sector does not “promote productive processes or enable the redistribu-
tion of economic benefits in the place of origin; therefore it does not promote or 
assure, in any case, the regional or local development. Quite on the contrary, it 
simply allows processes of accelerated recovery of capital investments as well as 
their expanded reproduction and, with it, the strengthening of a small power block 
that controls the process” [8].
As for Mexico, experts say that its economic growth has stagnated and this 
has to do with the capitalist crisis that has shaken the whole world. Part of the 
dominant discourse states that Mexico should encourage direct investment. Last 
year, Mexico achieved a growth of 3.6% of GDP, and for 2014 it is estimated 
to be 2.4% according to the IMF (well below the predictions of up to 5% that 
were made by different institutions and government agencies in that country). 
The dreamed growth, experts say, can be due to industrial activities, increased 
public spending, and the application of structural reforms. There is a close 
relationship between economic growth and investment, where we know that 
foreign investment has been a central element. Thus, in terms of mining in 2012, 
there was 1101.4 million dollars in investment in the mining industry according 
to INEGI data.
Despite these “achievements” we see that in Mexico in 2010 there were 52.1 mil-
lion poor people where the State of Mexico, Veracruz, Chiapas, Puebla, and Jalisco 
were those who occupied the first places. By 2012, 11.5 million people were living in 
extreme poverty. On the other hand, wage rates in Mexico turn out to be among the 
lowest in Latin America.
In the case of the Sierra Norte de Puebla, we can see that the state uses several 
mechanisms to strip and privatize the “ejidos” or communal territories belonging 
to the indigenous. However, this dispossession policy could not be understood if we 
do not consider the general context in which the state moves. It is from the taking 
of the presidency with Enrique Peña Nieto that there has been a wave of violence 
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against several sectors reflected, in its pure form, in all the reforms that had been 
postponed before the 2012 elections. These reforms, especially the energy and the 
educational one, have caused the privatization of the services that are considered 
an obligation of the state. However, at the end of 2013, the energy reform gives 
rise to the exploitation of resources by private companies which is “normal” and 
part “necessary” for the development of the country, without the state has any real 
interference except the violence. As an example, we have the murder of a peasant 
leader Antonio Esteban Cruz on June 4, 2014, in the municipality of Cuetzalan del 
Progreso where the Regional Committee of the Independent Peasant and Urban 
Peasant Workers Movement (Miocup) and the association Tetela Hacia el Futuro ask 
to clarify the said harassment holding the state responsible for such acts.
In the case of the state of Puebla, it can be observed that 87% of the employed 
population earn less than 5 minimum wages (Salary Observatory of the Universidad 
Iberoamericana Puebla). In the Sierra Norte de Puebla, it can be observed that of the 
217 municipalities that make up the state of Puebla, 125 municipalities considered “pri-
ority attention” where 36 have a very high degree of marginalization, 60 high, and 29 
medium [9]. We are talking about the fact that in the region, half of its population is in 
a situation of marginalization. In the Sierra Norte de Puebla, the conditions of poverty 
have not been overcome due to the colonial legacy of the type of clientelistic relations 
and dependency that were woven through time to the neoliberal configuration in 
the current capitalism. The risk condition for the rural population has always been a 
constant, and their permanence has not been due to a longer life expectancy but to the 
way in which the peasants deploy strategies of resistance in order to survive. Thus, in 
this area, there have been various types of survival strategies, but the current mobiliza-
tion and organization against the neoliberal policy around the dispossession of lands in 
the name, again, of progress have not been compared in recent years. This progress has 
specific names such as gas pipelines, mining, etc., which have been anchored in places 
where the majority of the population is indigenous or of peasant origin. Therefore, the 
current economic activity could not be understood without considering the general 
panorama that the state of Puebla is experiencing within neoliberalism.
2. The state and extractive capitalism
The growth of extractive mining capital in Peru responds to some extent to the 
economic and social changes generated with Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) in the 
1990s. At the time, this regime responded in some way and managed immediately 
to the economic crisis caused by Alan Garcia (1985–1990) during the second half 
of the 1980s. For this date, the country suffered an internal war unleashed between 
the Shining Path Communist Party and the state and a dramatic economic crisis. 
Inflation had reached the end of this decade at 7650%, solvable only by means of a 
drastic restructuring of social relations.
This economic and political crisis made the national scenario collapse. For many, 
it was the justifiable reason for Fujimori to carry out an adjusted line of neoliberal 
policies. However, it was also the mitigating factor for the Peruvian bourgeoisie to 
be legitimized once again by Fujimori.
From then on, the scenario was different. Everything seemed to indicate that 
neoliberal policies worked perfectly. Thus, the first years of the Fujimorist govern-
ment reflected optimal results based on economic growth. As an act of magic, 
Peru had an economic stability never expected: the gross domestic product in 1994 
reached 13.1%, being the highest in the world, and in 1991, unlike in previous years, 
inflation had been reduced to 139% [10].
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However, these changes in the economy responded more to the effects of a policy 
imposed through violence. In 1992, Fujimori perpetuated a self-coup of state with 
the aim of approving a new Constitution (1993) that guarantees legitimacy and 
capitalist accumulation. The reforms and constitutional guarantees that the state 
provided were the most favorable for more than one company decided to invest 
in the country. Within these reforms was to promote not only the investment of 
foreign capital, but to privatize state industries. As Gonzales de Olarte mentions for 
“1996, 6.312 million dollars had been accumulated as a result of privatizations of 
state enterprises” that could not be used for fear of other inflations or the presence 
of some “exogenous shock or a balance of payments crisis” [10].
In addition, in 1997 the state had ceded “132 companies to the private sector 
out of a total of 186 national companies.” The first companies that were granted to 
private capital were those industries that were dedicated to the extraction of natural 
resources. Among these were “Hierro Perú, Refinería de Hilo, Cía. Minera Tintaya, 
Metal Oroya, Mining Company Mahr Tunel, Cement Lima, Cementos Yura, and 
Refinery of Cajamarquilla (mining industry),” among others [10].
In the case of Puebla, more specifically in the Sierra Norte de Puebla, we can 
see that the state uses several mechanisms to strip and privatize the “ejidos” or 
territories belonging to indigenous. However, this dispossession policy could not 
be understood if we do not consider the general context in which the state moves. It 
is from the taking of the presidency with Enrique Peña Nieto that there has been a 
wave of violence against several sectors reflected, in its pure form, in all the reforms 
that had been postponed before the 2012 elections. These reforms, especially the 
energy and the educational one, have caused the privatization of the services that 
are considered an obligation of the state. However, at the end of 2013 the energy 
reform gives rise to the exploitation of resources by private companies which is 
“normal” and part “necessary” for the development of the country, without the 
state has any real interference except the violence. As an example, we have the mur-
der of a peasant leader Antonio Esteban Cruz on June 4, 2014, in the municipality of 
Cuetzalan del Progreso where the Regional Committee of the Independent Peasant 
and Urban Peasant Workers Movement (Miocup) and the association Tetela Hacia el 
Futuro ask to clarify the said harassment holding the state responsible for such acts.
The state is a “specific social form [that] is only able to maintain itself to the 
extent that it continues to be guaranteed” capitalist economic reproduction [10]. It 
means that the state becomes capital because it derives as “objective form of social 
relations” and its political actions, besides guaranteeing its existence, reproduce 
capitalism on a planetary scale. In this regard Mariano Feliz [11] says the following:
it expresses the domination of capital in society, its policies naturally tend to favor 
its reproduction as the dominant social relation. This is particularly true in the 
peripheral economies whose state-shaped from the world-constituted economy […] 
-does not act simply to reproduce class domination at the local level (of the local 
bourgeoisies), but rather is the place where It will crystallize the need to reproduce 
capital on an international scale. The State is not placed above the law of value 
(i.e., the law of surplus value), but is part of it.
This capacity of capitalism (mining) presupposes, in Marx’s words, the reduc-
tion of the individual to himself, that is, to “a natural subject” [12]. As such, this 
subject is absorbed into the “circle of production conditions” of extractive capital-
ism, whose expansion occurs in forms of accumulation by dispossession [13]. In 
other words, it is an accumulation that expropriates all human capacity as a power, 
an accumulation that carries forward:
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The privatization of the land; the expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion 
of the different forms of property into private property; the suppression of commu-
nal resources; the elimination of alternative forms of production and consumption; 
the colonial appropriation of natural resources; monetization and taxation; the 
trafficking of human beings; Usury and indebtedness through credit. [14]
This form of accumulation is described by Marx as the “midwife of history,” 
because it deals with the vertiginous changes and mutations of patriarchal social 
forms to a generalized form of capitalist production. For Marx, work is considered 
the very essence of human fulfillment, a creative capacity that, in addition to pos-
sessing qualitative characteristics, is crossed and subsumed by capitalist logic. In 
Marx’s words, it is about the double dimension of work (concrete work and abstract 
work) that determines the history of the struggle. As he mentions:
The tendency of capital is precisely this to remove the natural foundation under 
the base of each industry, to transplant its conditions of production out of it, to a 
general connection, and hence the conversion of what was seen as superfluous into 
something necessary, in a historically generated need. [13]
The generalized production of capital leads to conditions of precariousness of 
work. However, this situation of precariousness of work, that is, instability and lack 
of sufficient guarantees to find work (salaried) in a certain place, must be under-
stood under the Marxist budget of “industrial reserve army.”
Under this conception it is understood that the increase of production and capi-
talist accumulation will generate a population “apparently” waiting to be absorbed 
by the productive process. For Marx this responds to a systemic law because “the 
greater this reserve army is in proportion to the active workers’ army, the more the 
mass of consolidated overpopulation spreads, whose misery is in inverse ratio to 
the torments of its work” [15]. This reserve industrial army does not mean that the 
individual is outside the capitalist production; on the contrary it is a system that 
generates a bulky growth of working population necessary for capitalist produc-
tion. Although the original dispossession and accumulation have created subjects 
incapable of supporting their own existence, we believe that the violent side that 
all this implies needs to be rethought since there is no place where those stripped of 
neoliberal capitalism enter as an army of labor.
3. Territorial disposal in Espinar
The province of Espinar, considered high-Andean zone, is located in the region 
of Cusco. It is located at an altitude between 3500 and 5000 m above sea level. The 
approximate extension of its territory is of 5311 km2. To date, Espinar has a popula-
tion of 62,000 inhabitants. In addition, it is estimated that 50% of its population 
is rural and lives in 72 communities distributed in the districts of Alto Pichigua, 
Condoroma, Coporaque, Espinar, Ocoururo, Pallpata, Pichigua, and Suyckutambo.
In the districts of Espinar, the existence of immense quantities of copper and 
gold has been discovered. At present, these minerals are exploited by the trans-
national company Xstrata Tintaya-Antapaccay, better known as the Antapaccay 
Project. For many specialists this project is considered one of the most important 
mining megaprojects in the history of Peru, but it is also one of the investments 
that has caused over time the territorial dispossession and precarization of living 
conditions:
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Four copper mines will talk during 2013. The four have just entered operations and 
it is estimated that after 2 years they will reach production levels never before reg-
istered in Peru: no less than 800,000 tons per year. That is, eight times more than 
what was planned to be extracted from Conga in a year without the social conflict 
that finally paralyzed her. Las Bambas, Toromocho, Antapaccay [Espinar] and the 
expansion of Antamina are those four copper projects whose production will allow 
the Peruvian economy to reach a growth rate of 6.9% in 2013. [16]
The coexistence—if you want, unstable, by the periodic mobilizations—of 
the communities of Espinar with mining companies has a history of more than 
30 years. In the decade of the 1980s, the government had the intention to impel 
a copper industrial plant in Espinar with the purpose that the zones devastated 
by the poverty entered new cycles of progress. This idea took shape in the second 
government of Belaunde Terry (1980–1985), because it was considered that the state 
should have its own companies that provide income and, in this way, can generate 
local and regional developments.
However, with Belaunde in the presidential chair, the episode of extractive min-
ing projects was marked by bloody results such as forced territorial expropriations 
and forced migrations to the surroundings of the mining industry. In many cases, 
several communities had to perish or were regrouped in areas where scarcity of 
resources affected daily life.
For the regulationist project to work, it was necessary to strip people’s assets. 
Palacios [18] mentions that at the beginning of the 1980s, the state had expropri-
ated in Espinar “2368 hectares of territory to the Peasant Community Anta Cama, 
parent of the Tintaya Marquiri community, thus initiating its dismemberment and 
subsequent disappearance” [17].
The state considered that the creation of a state enterprise could generate work 
(salaried) and greater benefits, especially for the communities where the “min-
ing enclaves,” were developing. The expropriation of the peasant communities in 
Espinar was considered by Belaunde as an achievement, since this would allow the 
establishment of the Special Mining Company Tintaya SA (EMATISA), later (1985) 
called Special Company Tintaya SA (Tintaya SA). As the activity of the company 
intensified the territorial dispossession was inexcusable, this also responded to 
the increase of exports and copper prices abroad. In 1983, the state managed to 
expropriate 2011.50 hectares of territory of the community of Tintaya Marquiri, 
204.73 hectares in the community of Alto Huancané, and 151.77 hectares of the 
community of Huancané Bajo that automatically passed into the hands of the com-
pany Tintaya SA. In order to compensate the damages caused to the peasants, the 
state company offered jobs and improvements in the infrastructure of the affected 
communities:
Among the main commitments signed in 1982 with the mining company was to 
grant a job to all those affected, after training. Carry out water and sewage con-
struction in the town center, educational center, medical post, paved streets, access 
road and support in construction of family homes. [18]
The dispossession gave clear signs of having become a necessary movement of 
capitalist reproduction. The deficient technology, the expansion of the market, and 
the opening of neoliberal policies showed a drastic panorama of changes in social 
relations. The companies could no longer be controlled by the state. Well, with the 
advent of the Fujimori government, almost all of the state companies were sold in 
an international public auction to the large transnational corporations. The invest-
ment of large transnational capitals in Peru motivated the authorities to deliver, for 
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example, among others, Tintaya SA de Espinar to the American company Magma 
Copper Company, in 1994.
In the decade of the 1990s, the communities of Tintaya Marquiri, Alto 
Huancané, Bajo Huancané, Huano Huano, and Alto Huarca suffered the most 
devastating effects of the large mining transnationals and the economic policies 
of the Fujimorist government. In 1996 BHP Australia managed to put pressure 
on the state so that it could promote the authorization of another 1263 hectares 
for its operations. The peasant communities had to cede their territories in a 
forced manner in exchange for relocations and proposals for sporadic work in 
the mine.
With Fujimori in power, the number of possession of territory had gone from 
10 to 34 million hectares at the hands of mining activity [19]. The destruction and 
deterioration of the communities worsened because the companies used state-of-
the-art technologies that facilitated greater exploration and extraction of minerals. 
Undoubtedly, the great technological and investment capacity of the transnationals 
exacerbated the situation of the peasants and implied that more of their territories 
are expropriated, thus causing a precarious work or make creative.
As Harvey [13] would say, the technological changes and the capacity to invest 
extractive capitalism in a specific place generates unemployment, it generates an 
industrial reserve army: capitalism creates its own other. It is a capitalist logic of 
permanent appropriation and ruthless exploitation of nature. As Leff points out, 
“the natural has become a fundamental argument to legitimize the existing, objec-
tive order” [20]. Undoubtedly, nature in capitalism is considered only as a produc-
tive process.
The forced dispossession, the subjection of creative work to forms of capitalist 
production, and the migration of people who go in search of employment tell us 
that accumulation by dispossession still stands. This fact for Marx is understood 
as the “original sin” of capital. Unlike Harvey, Marx does not expose the “primitive 
accumulation” to indicate that after this what remains to the current world is “an 
enlarged reproduction” (although the exploitation of live labor in production is 
mediated), in conditions of “Peace, property and equality” [13]. On the contrary, 
Marx considers that original sin is the beginning of an incessant struggle in and 
under the capital-labor relation.
On the other hand, the interest of the companies in Espinar grew in the mid-
1990s because there was a rise in the price of gold and silver. This generated a 
radical turn of the social and labor activity of the peasants. The forced territorial 
dispossession brought with it a generalized form of unemployment and job insecu-
rity; in turn, a relative growth of private property was being generated. The acceler-
ated change of industrial expansion in Peru and the legal facilities that the state 
provided to the private sector was well regarded by foreign capital:
While the global investment in exploration grew 90% and quadrupled in Latin 
America, between 1990 and 1997, in Peru it increased twenty times … In 1997, the 
peak of exploration in the five-year period 1995–2000, Latin America (US $ 1242 
million) was the place with the highest proportion of explorations in Australia 
(US $ 875 million), Africa and Asia (US $ 550 million each) [19].
The increase in copper prices caused capital to move to spaces where conditions 
were favorable. In 1996, the copper and gold deposits controlled in Espinar by 
Magma Copper Company were acquired by the Australian transnational Broken Hill 
Proprietary Inc. (BHP). This new company also began to buy and expropriate more 
territories, causing the population centers around the company to increase. For just 
citing:
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In 1996, BHP Tintaya S. A purchased 1263 ha of land from the community of 
Tintaya Marquiri, former annex of the community of Antaycama. This operation 
displaced some families that happened to form the Tintaya Marquiri town center, 
established adjacent to the property of the Mining camp. [21]
However, the good situation of metals in the world forced more transnational 
capital to mobilize. After BHP bought Macma Magma Copper, it decided to merge 
with Billiton Plc, in 2001, under the name of BHP Billiton Tintaya SA. The purpose 
of its merger, in addition to its metal-mining production, was to control the world 
copper market and operate throughout the globe [22].
The operations of the transnationals in Espinar are marked by an open struggle 
of the peasants against their presence. In 1996, for example, BHP Billiton considered 
it necessary to acquire 1263 hectares, this time from the Tintaya Marquiri Peasant 
Community. Not only that, the company acquired 246 hectares of the Alto Huancané 
Community to provide security to the tailings dam produced by the extraction of 
minerals. In addition, this same company sought to award another 400.85 hectares of 
the Huano Huano Community and 477 hectares of the Alto Huarca Community as a 
result of the exploration work carried out by company specialists [23].
In 2006, the peasants of Espinar mobilized against BHP for the tailings contami-
nation that this company was generating. This mobilization involved the sale of 
BHP Billinton and Billiton Plc to the Swiss company Xstrata Copper, now known as 
Xstrata Tintaya. This company is the fourth largest producer of copper in the world 
and is currently in charge of the Antapaccay Project in Espinar, which, as a mining 
reserve area, started operating since 2010 (Figure 1).
According to CooperAccion until 2010, mining had caused more than 34% of the 
territory of the province of Espinar to concession to transnational companies (see 
Figure 2). However, we believe that in order to carry out territorial concessions in 
Figure 1. 
Territorial expropriation in Espinar [24].
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favor of transnationals, it is necessary to consider the decisive participation of the 
state. As we mentioned above, it is an entity that supports one of the wildest forms of 
accumulation and reproduction of capitalism. We refer to a form of accumulation by 
forced dispossession that, in areas where the territory is vital for the social reproduc-
tion of the community, is legitimized by the state.
The communications launched by Xstrata indicate that in 2013 the mining project 
Antapaccay de Espinar will produce an average of 160,000 tons of copper, in addition 
to other minerals such as gold and silver. Over time, this growth will continue causing 
greater dispossession. To date, the territory of the Espinar communities under conces-
sion in favor of the transnational company Xstrata exceeds 180,000 hectares.
4. The mining capitalism in the Sierra Norte de Puebla
Puebla is not considered as an area with mining tradition; on the contrary, in fact 
the image we see is that of a place where something new begins whose magnitude 
of the devastating consequences (of what arises) is still unthinkable for thousands 
of people. It is not only about generating innocuous economic activities to promote 
“development” in the Puebla region, but it is also a vision of a neoliberal society that 
does not contemplate the needs of the population, which is little by little stripped of 
its own resources. In addition to resources, we are seeing the radical transformation 
of life where centralization and authoritarianism cancel the possibilities of a plural 
and democratic life. In Puebla, capitalism has taken a turn since 2011 where they 
want to carry out by the use of force and intimidation economic projects linked to 
transnationals that few benefits will bring to the population: water privatization, gas 
pipeline projects, mining, and planning of megahighways like Arco Norte and Arco 
Sur Poniente. The Integral Morelos Project (PIM), which involves two thermoelectric 
plants (which are said to give energy to mining companies), a gas pipeline (Morelos 
gas pipeline) and an aqueduct with a total investment of 1600 million dollars, has 
Figure 2. 
Map of municipalities of Puebla with concessions to companies (source: [30]).
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been questioned by residents of Puebla, Tlaxcala, and Morelos not without the 
violent response of the state. They are large exploitation complexes that have tried to 
establish themselves sometimes with the use of deception. Daniel Rojas, leader of a 
group, estimated that with the work to be developed, about 800 “ejidatarios” from 19 
municipalities would be affected, which will affect the cultivation of vegetables [25].
In the case of mining companies, the situation is part of that neoliberal vision to 
increase the economic supply. Thus, we have since 1992 the mining legislation that 
has been in force as long as this activity has been arranged for private investment, 
both public and private. The problem before these privatizations promotes the end 
of the sovereignty that the nation has to have some contribution for this activity 
and that this development represents a violation of the fundamental rights of the 
workers and the contamination of the environment.
On December 20, 2013, the Energy Reform was enacted, where it is supposedly 
intended to modernize Mexico; others consider that this reform is the continuation of a 
conservative revolution that was evidenced in 1992, where the distribution of land was 
clearly ended and the way was opened for the expropriation of ejidos and communal 
lands. In 2013, from the state, proposals are still made to reform articles 27 and 28 of 
the Constitution (economic chapter) since both evidence the illegality and contradic-
tion that is manifested in the Foreign Investment Law, which in addition to allowing an 
investment 100% foreign investment displaces the state as rector of a strategic industry 
where the benefits that could be obtained from the said exploitation of resources 
become only minimal symbolic contributions, that is, fair contributions are not 
received for extracted minerals [26]. We believe that we should talk about privatiza-
tion in the context of mining companies because of the insistence on modifying the 
aforementioned constitutional articles that promote dispossession and lack of rights.
The mining legislation, as Jaime Cárdenas [27] points out, infringes on consti-
tutional rights. This situation was addressed in the so-called Pact for Mexico. In this 
political agreement, among other things, it meant preserving, at least on paper, the 
regulation of the state as well as respecting the rights of indigenous communities 
and peoples. However, this document did not specify the specific strategy to increase 
contributions for the mining activity, nor did it indicate the manner in which the 
redistribution of these resources would be made, nor did it say anything about how 
they could access justice to people who will be affected by these activities.
Thus, by October 2013, 69 authorized projects were counted in the Sierra Norte 
de Puebla with the outrage of many organizations who were not even consulted 
about the project. Such was the case of the municipality of Cuetzalan del Progreso 
where its municipal president noted that the Ministry of the Environment and 
Natural Resources (Semarnat) had refused to provide information on mining 
concessions [28]. This pressure on the part of the population has been an agreement 
of the resistance for the government to deny exploration and exploitation which 
permits entrepreneurs without prior popular consultation. The resistance in Zautla 
or Tetela de Ocampo, that Huauchinango, Huehuetlan el Grande, Tlatlauquitepec, 
Olintla, etc., are just some of the towns that have organized to stop the imminent 
advance of the Canadian, the Australian, and especially the Mexican mining Group 
Frisco, which belongs to Carlos Slim [28].
In Puebla, according to the data provided by Project Poder, 45% of the conces-
sions were from Mexican companies (with a predominance of Grupo Frisco and 
Grupo México), 35% were in the hands of foreign companies, and the rest were 
private individuals. These miners have obtained 35 concessions equivalent to 
918,000 hectares for mining exploitation; instead, it calculates 12,800 hectares for 
hydrocarbons. By the end of 2013, they had identified “six hydroelectric projects 
that will affect 18 municipalities and 12 rivers” [29]. These miners try to extract 
material through hydraulic fracturing either to obtain gas, oil, or metals.
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5. Conclusions
One of the greatest effects produced by mining capitalism in the so-called Third 
World countries such as Peru and Mexico have been exclusion and social margin-
alization. Moreover, although the state points out that private investment and the 
exploitation of natural resources generate social welfare and economic growth, the 
results have not been as expected. On the contrary, in the places where the mining 
industry has settled, there has been an accelerated reorganization of space and daily 
work. Of course, this phenomenon is not a novelty, but it is currently presented as a 
unique and modernizing event for the society.
The precedent of this contradictory experience is Espinar. It is a region where 
the accumulation of dispossession has forced thousands of peasants to leave their 
territories and offer their labor power to large mining companies at a cheap price. 
In other words, this phenomenon in Espinar has become the norm, in a form of 
prolonged accumulation described by Marx as the origins of capitalism and the 
beginning of the history of domination and resistance.
On the other hand, in the case of the Sierra Norte, the tendency seems to be the 
same, but the resistance of the so-called Meeting of Peoples in Resistance, Tiyat 
Tlalli, and MAPDER (Mexican Movement of Affected and Affected by Dams and in 
Defense of the Rivers) has managed to stop the advance of this new form of capi-
talist accumulation. All these mobilizations are undertaking various strategies of 
struggle despite the repression exercised by the state; however, the power of capital 
will not rest to enforce these so-called death plans. In Latin America the scenario is 
dark, and the onslaught and the return of it may involve a greater participation of 
the state, but of course the resistance will depend on how these contradictions are 
understood by the civil society itself.
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